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WHEN JUSTICE SHOULD PRECEDE 
GENEROSITY:  THE CASE AGAINST 
CHARITABLE IMMUNITY IN ARKANSAS∗  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Davis Smith checked into Generous Health Hospital, a 
registered charitable institution, for a simple procedure.1  
However, complications occurred when the doctor punctured an 
organ, sending Mr. Smith into cardiac arrest.  After emergency 
surgery, the seemingly simple operation was complete.  Although 
Mr. Smith survived, the Smiths’ lives have entirely changed.  The 
doctor’s avoidable error left Mr. Smith with worsened heart 
problems.  He lost his job and his health insurance, causing the 
Smiths to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars in follow-up 
care—diminishing their life savings—until Mr. Smith could 
receive disability benefits. 
“When things like this happen in the hospital, questions 
arise:  Who’s responsible?  If treatment makes things worse . . . 
who pays?  The answer, it seems, is that it depends.”2  In states 
that recognize charitable immunity, including Arkansas, the 
hospital would be immune from tort liability should the court 
recognize their charitable status.3  Unfortunately, this compounds 
the financial, physical, and emotional burdens already 
experienced by patients and families such as the Smiths.4  This 
 
       ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Arkansas School of Law.  The author would like 
to express her sincerest thanks to Professor Will Foster for his wisdom and encouragement 
throughout the process of writing this Comment.  In addition, the author would like to 
thank the editors of Arkansas Law Notes for the time and effort put forth throughout the 
publication process.  Finally, the author is immensely grateful to all of her friends and 
family who consistently provided their unwavering love and support.   
1. Shefali Luthra, When Something Goes Wrong at the Hospital, Who Pays?, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 11, 2015), [https://perma.cc/UYR3-ZGAN].  The scenario that follows 
in the Introduction is based on the real-life consequences a husband and wife faced.  Their 
story can be read at the article cited in this Comment.  
2. Id. 
3. 1 HOWARD W. BRILL & CHRISTIAN H. BRILL, ARKANSAS LAW OF DAMAGES § 33:2 
(2020).  
4. See The Quality of Mercy: “Charitable Torts” and Their Continuing Immunity, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 1382, 1387, 1390 (1987).  
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Comment discusses various aspects of the modern hospital and 
examines charitable immunity’s incompatibility with modern 
law.  
First, Part II explains the historical justifications for 
immunity and presents the doctrine’s landscape in the United 
States.  Part III examines the role precedent plays in continuing 
to adhere to the rule of immunity.  Part IV takes an in-depth 
approach of the big business of hospitals by evaluating various 
financial aspects of charitable hospitals.  Part V explores the 
reality of charitable immunity falling out of touch with concepts 
of modern law.  Part VI takes a more specific look at the 
application of the law in Arkansas, and Part VII concludes by 
encouraging the Arkansas Supreme Court to consider the 
imbalance of justice and generosity imposed by the doctrine.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
Charitable immunity, a common law doctrine that precludes 
liability of charitable institutions for negligence, has a tumultuous 
history.5  Many scholars credit Massachusetts as the first state to 
recognize the doctrine in 1876.6  However, this is not necessarily 
true.  Prior to 1876, Arkansas had twenty years of precedent 
protecting assets held in trust by charitable institutions.7  
In 1856, the Arkansas Supreme Court acknowledged the 
concept of charitable immunity when it prevented the sale of a 
plot of land because the land was donated to the Methodist 
 
5. Christa S. Clark, Tort Law—Tort Immunity for Non-Profits—Is the Charitable 
Immunity Defense Becoming an Offense for Arkansas Hospitals? George v. Jefferson Hosp. 
Ass’n, 337 Ark. 206, 987 S.W.2d 710 (1999), 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 125, 128, 
132 (1999) (“Unlike [the doctrine’s] turbulent history found elsewhere, . . . in Arkansas [it] 
has remained steadfast.”). 
6. See, e.g., Paul T. O’Neill, Charitable Immunity: The Time to End Laissez-Faire 
Health Care in Massachusetts Has Come, 82 MASS. L. REV. 223, 225 (1997) (stating that 
“[i]n the United States the theory of charitable immunity first was espoused in 
Massachusetts”); The Quality of Mercy, supra note 4, at 1383-84 (1987) (“Massachusetts . . . 
fashioned . . . a blanket doctrine of charitable immunity. . . . [Other] states . . . followed 
suit.”). 
7. See infra note 8 and accompanying text.  Compare BRILL, supra note 3, § 33:2 
(“Arkansas has recognized the doctrine of charitable immunity since 1856. . . . [It] is an 
affirmative defense.”), with O’Neill, supra note 6, at 225 (stating that the Massachusetts case 
that first recognized the doctrine was decided in 1876). See generally Grissom v. Hill, 17 
Ark. 483, 1856 WL 609 (1856).  Arkansas courts did not at that time use the later recognized 
title of “charitable immunity.”  
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Protestant Church for “purely charitable” purposes.8  The court 
found this “purely charitable” purpose clause prevented the 
selling of the property because “carry[ing] out the intention of the 
donor” is the most important duty of those who hold property in 
trust.9  Thus, while not directly utilizing the “charitable 
immunity” title, Arkansas recognized the doctrine’s substance.10  
Despite being the first state to utilize charitable immunity, 
Arkansas is now one of the last states clinging to the archaic 
doctrine.11  
The formal—and foundationally—weak rise of charitable 
immunity began in Massachusetts and relied on English 
precedent.12  Holliday v. Parish of St. Leonard, from which 
American jurisprudence developed, was subsumed from dicta of 
two previously overturned cases.13  Further, as the doctrine was 
gaining traction in the United States, Holliday was overturned.14  
Moreover, even if Holliday had not been overturned, its facts are 
distinguishable from the factual background of charitable 
 
8. Grissom, 17 Ark. at 484, 488-89, 491, 1856 WL 609, at *2, *5, *7. 
9. Id. at 484-89, 1856 WL 609, at *2-5. 
10. See BRILL, supra note 3, § 33:2 (“The rationale behind [charitable immunity] is 
that agencies, entities and trusts created and maintained exclusively for charity should not 
have their assets diminished to satisfy a judgment . . . .”).   
11. Janet Fairchild, Annotation, Tort Immunity of Nongovernmental Charities—
Modern Status, 25 A.L.R. 4th 517, II. B., § 6 (1983).  This section of the annotation lists 
those states where immunity has been partially or wholly retained.  Arkansas is one of four 
states referenced along with Massachusetts, South Carolina, and Virginia.  
12. O’Neill, supra note 6, at 225-26 (“[A]s the sole authority for [Massachusetts’] new 
rule, [the justice] misinterpreted and then relied on the dicta of the previously overruled 
English case . . . .”). 
13. Id. (explaining that “the Holliday decision upon which [the justice] relied as 
justification for his adoption of charitable immunity was, itself, inherently flawed.  The 
Holliday decision misinterpreted two English cases, The Feoffees of Heriot’s Hospital v. 
Ross and Duncan v. Findlater . . . .”); see also President of Georgetown Coll. v. Hughes, 130 
F.2d 810, 815-17 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (“The foundation of immunity in this country is the dictum 
of . . . The Feoffees of Heriot’s Hospital v. Ross . . . . Duncan v. Findlater . . . uttered a similar 
dictum, and this was followed in Holliday v. St. Leonard . . . . However, the dictum of 
Duncan v. Findlater was overruled by Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, . . . and the ruling of 
Holliday v. St. Leonard was reversed by Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury . . . .” (citations 
omitted)).  
14. O’Neill, supra note 6, at 227 (“[W]hen [the judge] created the doctrine of charitable 
immunity in Massachusetts, English law already was well settled . . . . [and] the most basic 
rule of tort law, liability for negligent conduct, prevailed in England . . . .”); see also Hughes, 
130 F.2d at 815-17 (“In this state of the English decisions, Massachusetts adopted the 
repudiated rule of Holliday v. St. Leonard in McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 
and Maryland followed Heriot’s case in Perry v. House of Refuge.” (citations omitted)).  
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immunity cases in American jurisprudence.15  Yet, by the 1940s, 
approximately forty states had adopted the doctrine.16  
Charitable immunity’s faulty foundation was exacerbated by 
each state’s theory in adopting the doctrine.17  The most 
prominent theory is the trust fund theory,18 which purports to 
protect assets held in trust by adhering to donative intent.19  
Presumably, this does not include utilizing monies to satisfy a 
judgment.  Other states relied upon the following theories when 
adopting charitable immunity: 
(1) Inapplicability of Respondeat Superior:  immunity 
from negligence as long as the charitable hospital was 
not negligent in hiring the employee because the 
employee was not under the control of the charitable 
hospital and, thus, the negligence was not caused by the 
charitable hospital. 20 
(2) Implied Waiver of Liability:  accepting the benefit of 
services from the charitable hospital waives liability and 
assumes the risk that negligence may occur.21 
 
15. O’Neill, supra note 6, at 226 (“[Holliday’s] holding was directed specifically at the 
creation of a public duty rule to protect public employees and servants from liability. The 
case did not create a liability shield for charitable trust funds.”).  Holliday focused on an 
employee’s, who was hired by trustees appointed under the Public Road Act thus creating a 
public duty, negligent maintenance of a public road.  Holliday v. Par. of St. Leonard, 142 
Eng. Rep. 769, 769-70 (1861).  In contrast, charitable immunity focuses on establishing 
immunity for charitable institutions.  See BRILL, supra note 3, § 33:2. 
16. Clark, supra note 5, at 129 (“The charitable immunity doctrine continued to expand 
to other jurisdictions in the United States, and by the early 1940s, over forty states accepted 
full charitable immunity as the prevailing view.”). 
17. See infra note 23; see also Hughes, 130 F.2d at 817-22. 
18. See supra note 9 and accompanying text; The Quality of Mercy, supra note 4, at 
1383 n.9. 
19. The Quality of Mercy, supra note 4, at 1384 (explaining that “charitable 
expenditures were said to be limited by the intent of the donor, which in turn was said not to 
include paying damages in tort”); Fairchild, supra note 11, at I., § 2 (“[F]unds of a charity 
are held in trust . . . [and] the charitable donor’s intent would be thwarted by [diversion of 
these funds to tort claimants], and donors might thereby be discouraged from charitable 
beneficence.”). 
20. Fairchild, supra note 11, at I., § 2 (explaining that charitable institutions are 
immune from liability “where the alleged negligence was that of its employees or servants, 
but not where the negligence complained of was . . . negligent selection of the negligent 
servant or employee, since such actions are considered as having been done by the charitable 
institution itself and not by its servants or agents”). 
21. See, e.g., O’Neill, supra note 6, at 228 (explaining that “implied waiver[] was 
founded on the premise that the beneficiaries of charities receive goods and services free of 
charge, provide no consideration in the bargain and impliedly assume all the risks of harm 
from the charity by accepting its munificence, and thus waive their rights to recourse”); 
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(3) Theory of Public Policy:  charitable hospitals should be 
protected from bankruptcy by avoiding monetary 
judgments when they have, historically, operated from 
donations and merely tried to do good by serving the 
poor.22 
These theories were soon criticized by courts and legal 
scholars.23  The doctrine’s demise began with its abrogation in 
President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes.24  In 
dismissing each theory, the D.C. Circuit recognized that although 
charitable institutions offer kindness, “[c]harity . . . cannot be 
careless.  When it is, it ceases to be kindness and becomes 
actionable wrongdoing.”25  
 
Fairchild, supra note 11, at I., § 2 (explaining that “the beneficiary of a charitable 
organization has, by accepting the benefits of the charity, impliedly waived liability or 
assumed the risk of negligence”). 
22. O’Neill, supra note 6, at 228-29 (stating that “imposition of liability on charities 
for their torts could drive them to bankruptcy, cause them to lose donors and volunteers and 
ultimately close their doors entirely and cease to offer the benefits of their work to the 
public. . . . [M]ost hospitals were, indeed, strictly, charitable institutions subsisting mainly 
on donations and providing medical care almost exclusively for the poor.”). 
23. Clark, supra note 5, at 130 (“Overall, the charitable immunity defense became 
fragmented, varying widely state to state, with each jurisdiction creating various exceptions 
and levels of abandonment.”); see, e.g., O’Neill, supra note 6, at 227-29 (“[T]hese theories 
were logically inconsistent, legal fictions, erroneous misapplications, or at best, poor excuses 
for depriving a victim from just and needed compensation.”); The Quality of Mercy, supra 
note 4, at 1387-89 (“[T]he notion that a charitable trust is precluded by the intent of its donors 
from paying out damages—is now plainly anachronistic. . . . [M]aintain[ing] that victims of 
charitable torts had implicitly waived liability by accepting charitable service[] was never 
more than fiction.”). 
24. See, e.g., The Quality of Mercy, supra note 4, at 1385 (“[T]he accumulated weight 
of these exceptions brought the doctrinal structure of charitable immunity to the point of 
collapse.  Inspired in part by Judge Rutledge’s lengthy criticism in President of Georgetown 
College v. Hughes, American courts moved rapidly away from charitable immunity.”); 
O’Neill, supra note 6, at 230 (stating that “[f]inally, . . . Justice Rutledge removed the last 
cornerstone justifying charitable immunity in his opinion in President and Directors of 
Georgetown College v. Hughes”). 
25. President of Georgetown Coll. v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 813, 818-22, 824-25 (D.C. 
Cir. 1942).  Justice Rutledge noted that:  “Five states . . . have no decisions on the subject.  
Eleven apparently adhere to full immunity . . . . Three certainly, and apparently a fourth, 
have imposed unqualified liability. . . . In seven states strangers and paying beneficiaries may 
recover . . . . The trend in ten states . . . seems clearly toward unqualified responsibility. . . . 
In thirteen of the remaining states, apparently, strangers are allowed to recover, but 
beneficiaries are denied relief.”  Id. at 818-21.  Justice Rutledge goes on to describe that no 
matter what theory a state chose to adhere to in adopting the doctrine, “[the theories] are 
merely different names for the same idea . . . . In any event[,] the result is a departure from 
general . . . principles of liability.”  Id. at 825. 
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Counter arguments for the trust fund and public policy 
theories are explained by the similarities of charitable hospitals 
and big businesses.26  Historically, charities operated without 
liability insurance, largely supported by donations, and primarily 
served the poor; however, the modern reality is that charitable 
hospitals have significant financial funding and both hospitals and 
patients are insured.27  In addition, the public policy theory has 
been criticized because it does not align with tort law’s policies 
of deterrence and compensation28 when charitable institutions are 
not held legally accountable and plaintiffs bear injury upon 
injury.29  
The theories of respondeat superior and waiver of liability 
have been targeted as “departure[s] from general . . .  principles 
of liability.”30  The exemption of the respondeat superior theory 
does not correspond with the trend of liability for negligence 
committed in the scope of employment.31  The employee is under 
the control of the charitable institution, and thus, the employer 
should be held liable.32  The trend was, and is, to distribute losses 
against the institution rather than leave the victim wholly to bear 
the loss.33 
 
26. Fairchild, supra note 11, at I., § 2 (stating that the trust fund theory is “inconsistent 
with modern reality, since modern charity or philanthropy is ‘big business’”). 
27. O’Neill, supra note 6, at 228-30; Hughes, 130 F.2d at 823-24; see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1979) (“The development 
of liability insurance has made it quite unlikely that donors would fail to recognize it as a 
legitimate expense of operation.”); Fairchild, supra note 11, at I., § 2, II.A., § 3 (stating that 
“liability insurance is widely and inexpensively available”); The Quality of Mercy, supra 
note 4, at 1395 (“Charities in modern times [are] better organized and wealthier than their 
nineteenth century counterparts. . . . [I]nsurance [has] become more widely available.”). 
28. STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., 1 AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 1:3 (Monique C. M. 
Leahy, ed. 2020) (“The fundamental policy purposes of the tort compensation system are 
compensation of innocent parties . . . and deterrence of wrongful conduct.”). 
29. O’Neill, supra note 6, at 229, 234 (“An innocent victim might literally have to bear 
the entire burden of both his treatment and his injury alone.”). 
30. Hughes, 130 F.2d at 824-25. 
31. See id. at 814, 827. 
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 27, § 895E cmt. c (The 
inapplicability of respondeat superior “runs counter to the whole law of vicarious liability 
. . . which is not limited to profitable enterprises and rests rather upon the employment of the 
servant, the employer’s direction and control over his conduct and the furtherance of an 
enterprise that he has set in motion.”). 
33. See Hughes, 130 F.2d at 824, 827 (describing “the injustice of giving benefit to 
some at the cost of injury to others and of the injured individual’s having to bear the loss 
wrongfully inflicted upon him, at a time when the direction of the law is toward social 
distribution of losses through liability for fault”). 
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The application of the waiver of liability theory requires a 
“knowing, voluntary and informed decision,” which is difficult to 
obtain from an injured person.34  Requiring this of an individual 
without bargaining power and without the requisite medical 
knowledge unreasonably places the burden of liability on the one 
who is incapable of knowing the difference—the physician knows 
the reasonable standard of care and is expected to live up to that 
standard.35  
Consequently, more than seventy-five percent of states have 
abolished the antiquated doctrine.36  However, some states, 
including Arkansas, still recognize a form of partial immunity.  
Although the Arkansas Supreme Court continues to adhere to its 
original reasoning for the doctrine’s adoption, the doctrine has 
transformed from protecting charitable assets from judgment 
(immunity from judgment) to immunity from suit, back to 
immunity from judgment, and, currently, back to immunity from 
suit, effectually limiting the right of redress to injured plaintiffs 
and leaving them “whipsawed” by the court.37  Further, the court 
has stated that application of the doctrine should be given a 
“narrow construction”; however, in overbroadly applying an 
 
34. O’Neill, supra note 6, at 228 (“In the field of medical care, a knowing, voluntary 
waiver often is impossible where . . . a patient is unconscious, immature or otherwise 
incapacitated.”). 
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 27, § 895E cmt. c (“The [patient] 
in fact understands and expects that he will be treated with reasonable care; and those who 
undertake to render . . . services are held, in general, to the standard of reasonable conduct 
in doing so.”); see also O’Neill, supra note 6, at 228 (“[W]hen people present for services or 
medical care at a hospital, most frequently they are ill or . . . in desperate need of assistance.  
Often, their condition prevents them from seeking assistance elsewhere such that they cannot 
and do not argue about the terms of their treatment.”). 
36. See generally GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., BOGERT’S THE LAW OF TRUSTS 
AND TRUSTEES § 402 (2020) (“By the end of the 20th Century, more than three quarters of 
the states had abolished or limited the doctrine of charitable immunity . . . .”); Fairchild, 
supra note 11 at II.A., § 3 to II.B., § 6 (listing those states and the corresponding authority 
that has completely abrogated or partially retained the doctrine).  Both of these sources 
provide a compiled list of states and the corresponding case or statute which has changed the 
law of charitable immunity within the state.  Notably, almost every state has accomplished 
abolition of the doctrine through the judiciary.  See Fairchild, supra note 11, at II.A. § 4[a], 
[b].  In comparing the sources, generally, the information is the same.  However, when 
updates in the law within a state had occurred, one source provided a more recent case or 
statute.  See id. at Table of Cases, Laws, and Rules. 
37. Downing v. Lawrence Hall Nursing Ctr., 2010 Ark. 175, at 10-11, 14, 16-17, 369 
S.W.3d 8, 15-18; Davis Nursing Ass’n v. Neal, 2019 Ark. 91, at 5, 570 S.W.3d 457, 460; 
Low v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 364 Ark. 427, 437-40, 220 S.W.3d 670, 677-80 (2005); George 
v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n, 337 Ark 206, 211, 987 S.W.2d 710, 712-13 (1999). 
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eight-factor test to determine whether an institution qualifies as a 
charity, the court has not followed its own instruction.38  The 
factor test has led to charitable status becoming a mixed matter of 
law and fact.39  
Compounding these inconsistencies, applying the eight-
factor test has led to piecemeal litigation.40  Generally, a denial of 
a motion for summary judgment is not appealable.41  Limited 
exceptions are provided for sovereign immunity, while charitable 
immunity has been judicially expanded.42  When the jury is 
 
38. George, 337 Ark. at 217-18, 987 S.W.2d at 716 (Brown, J., dissenting) (“[W]e . . . 
give the doctrine [of charitable immunity] a very narrow construction.”); see also Clark, 
supra note 5, at 143.  This Comment analyzes the George decision in detail and explains that 
in the dissent, Justice Brown, “noted that the majority’s approach abandoned the Williams 
mandate of narrow construction for the defense of charitable immunity and therefore 
broadened the defense by refusing to narrowly apply the Masterson factors.”  Clark, supra 
note 5, at 143; see also Masterson v. Stambuck, 321 Ark. 391, 400-01, 902 S.W.2d 803, 809-
10 (1995).  The Arkansas Supreme Court adopted this eight-factor test set forth by the 
Eastern District of Virginia in 1993.  Masterson, 321 Ark. at 400-01, 902 S.W.2d at 809.  
The test, composed of eight factors, all of which are illustrative, and not considered to be 
exhaustive, include:  
(1) whether the organization’s charter limits it to charitable . . . purposes; (2) 
whether the organization’s charter contains a “not-for-profit” limitation; (3) 
whether the organization’s goal is to break even; (4) whether the organization 
earned a profit; (5) whether any profit or surplus must be used for charitable 
. . . purposes; (6) whether the organization depends on contributions and 
donations for its existence; (7) whether the organization provides its services 
free of charge to those unable to pay; and (8) whether the directors and officers 
receive compensation. 
 Id. at 400-01, 902 S.W.2d at 809-10. 
39. See Davis, 2019 Ark. 91, at 8, 570 S.W.3d at 462 (“If the existence of charitable 
immunity turns on disputed factual issues, then the jury may determine the facts, and the . . . 
court will subsequently determine whether those facts are sufficient to establish charitable 
immunity.”).  When facts are undisputed, charitable status is a matter of law decided by the 
judge.  Id. at 6, 570 S.W.3d at 461.  When facts are disputed, the question of charitable status 
is to be presented to the jury.  Id., 570 S.W.3d at 461.  Yet, when facts are undisputed but 
subject to differing legal interpretations, the question of charitable status is a matter of law 
to be decided by the court, and when “reasonable persons would not reach different 
conclusions based upon those undisputed facts,” summary judgment should be granted.  Id. 
at 6-7, 570 S.W.3d at 461 (quoting Anglin v. Johnson Reg’l Med. Ctr., 375 Ark. 10, 21, 289 
S.W.3d 28, 35 (2008)).   
40. See id. at 9-10, 570 S.W.3d at 462-63 (Baker, J., dissenting) (stating that “the 
purpose of a final order is to avoid piecemeal litigation”). 
41. Ark. R. App. P.–Civ. 2(a)(2).  When an order determines the action, such as 
summary judgment, and prevents a judgment from being appealed, or discontinues the 
action, the losing party may appeal.  See Appellees’ Supplemental Abstract and Brief at ARG 
3, St. Bernards Cmty. Hosp. v. Cheney, No. CV-19-324 (Ark. Ct. App. July 1, 2019), 
[https://perma.cc/39Q4-REQP] [hereinafter Brief for Appellee]. 
42. See Ark. R. App. P.–Civ. 2(a)(10); Davis, 2019 Ark. 91, at 1 n.1, 570 S.W.3d at 
459 n.1.  But see Brief for Appellee, supra note 41, at ARG 3-4. 
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instructed to decide the institution’s charitable status, a bifurcated 
trial must be set, thus prolonging the underlying question of 
negligence.43  
As predicted, the state of the law has led to collateral 
litigation, increased expenses, clogged dockets, and immense 
confusion.44  Arkansas plaintiffs have repeatedly called for 
charitable immunity’s abrogation,45 yet the court continues to 
remain “lost in the fog” of its muddled history while refraining 
from forgoing “the anomaly that the institutional doer of good 
[has] exemption from responsibility for its wrong, though all 
others must pay.”46  Adherence to the doctrine results in “great 
injury” and must be abolished.47  
III.  THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 
The American legal system allows for changes in the law 
through the judiciary, which interprets the law, and the 
legislature, which makes the law.48  How much power each 
respective branch of government holds has long been a point of 
contention.49  Interestingly, the doctrine of charitable immunity 
 
43. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 41, at ARG 2. 
44. Brian Brooks, Clayborn and Scamardo: Two Nails in the Coffin of Charitable 
Immunity, 39-SUM ARK. LAW. 16, 18-19 (2004) (explaining that inefficiencies would likely 
arise from the Arkansas Supreme Court decisions in Clayborn and Scamardo). 
45. E.g., Downing v. Lawrence Hall Nursing Ctr., 2010 Ark. 175, at 6, 369 S.W.3d 8, 
13; Ark. Elder Outreach of Little Rock, Inc. v. Nicholson, 2013 Ark. App. 758, at 6-7, 2013 
WL 6706095, at *3. 
46. President of Georgetown Coll. v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 815, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1942). 
47. Scamardo v. Jaggers, 356 Ark. 236, 242, 149 S.W.3d 311, 314 (2004) (noting that 
the court “does have the power to overrule prior decisions, [but] it is necessary, as a matter 
of public policy, to uphold those decisions unless a great injury or injustice would result”).  
48. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 147, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” It must “expound and 
interpret [the] rule” subject to “such exceptions, and under such regulations as congress shall 
make.”). 
49. See id. at 174 (“If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the legislature 
to apportion the judicial power between the supreme and inferior courts according to the will 
of that body, it would certainly have been useless to have proceeded further than to have 
defined the judicial power . . . . If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate 
jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and 
original jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution 
of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without substance.”). 
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illustrates courts’ authority to both establish and overrule legal 
rules through case law.50  
A. Whose Province of Power 
A lingering issue in charitable immunity’s history has been 
which branch of government should alter the doctrine given that 
it is grounded in public policy, which is generally the legislative 
branch’s prerogative.51  However, public policy decisions have 
never been in the hands of “the [l]egislature alone,”52 and this is 
especially true when an individual’s rights are questioned.53  For 
example, charitable immunity cuts off the rights of the injured to 
seek relief, adding injury upon injury by making the individual 
bear the burden of what more appropriately should be borne by 
the charitable institution.54  
Many state supreme courts have acted upon their duty to 
overrule the injustice of charitable immunity because the 
judiciary is given the power to protect against “individual hurt.”55  
 
50. Miss. Baptist Hosp. v. Holmes, 55 So. 2d 142, 152 (Miss. 1951) (stating that “the 
courts have created an immunity, which, under all legal theories, is basically unsound . . . . 
[W]hen the reason for the existence of a declared public policy no longer obtains, the court 
should, without hesitation, declare that such policy no longer exists, and especially where 
the same has been created by the courts instead of by the Legislature.”). 
51. See Pierce v. Yakima Valley Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 260 P.2d 765, 774 (Wash. 1953).  
The Washington Supreme Court, when abolishing charitable immunity, explained that  
[t]he public policy upon which [charitable immunity] is based is legislative in 
character. . . . It pertains . . . to broad economic and social considerations. . . . 
Many courts have expressed the view that it is for the legislature, and not for 
the courts, to establish a policy exempting charities from tort liability. . . . 
However, having previously undertaken this function, and having now 
concluded that our court-declared policy is no longer valid, there seems to be 
no compelling reason why we must wait for legislative action.  
Id. at 774-75. 
52. Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 1242, 429 S.W.2d 45, 47 (1968) (stating that 
“[c]onsiderations of public policy are not and never have been for determination by the 
Legislature alone”). 
53. Id. at 1242-43, 429 S.W.2d at 47 (emphasizing that it is even more important for 
the judiciary to consider public policy decisions when “the individual’s rights are put in 
question by governmental activity”). 
54. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
55. Parish, 244 Ark. at 1242, 429 S.W.2d at 47; see, e.g., Harris v. Young Women’s 
Christian Ass’n, 237 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ind. 1968) (“[T]he duty of this Court is to repudiate 
the doctrine of charitable immunity and in view of the fact that it is a Court-made rule, it is 
hereby abolished by this Court without waiting for the intervention of the Legislative Branch 
of Government.”); Albritton v. Neighborhood Ctrs. Ass’n for Child Dev., 466 N.E.2d 867, 
871 (Ohio 1984) (“[T]his court not only has the power but the duty and responsibility to 
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The Arkansas Supreme Court has recognized that denying 
someone the ability “to sue for an alleged wrong . . .  minimize[s] 
protection of the public interest.”56  Further, the court has 
emphasized that “the most practical way to protect” an 
individual’s interest when tortious conduct occurs is to provide 
the individual an opportunity to seek legal relief.57  
Moreover, charitable immunity was a rule based on a public 
policy surmised by the judiciary.58  Notably, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court has stated that “[j]udicially created actions can be 
judicially abolished.”59  Without waiting for the legislature to act, 
the court itself abolished another form of immunity—municipal 
immunity.60  Thereafter, the legislature stepped in,61 making it 
reasonable to assume the same could occur should the court 
abolish charitable immunity.  
Nevertheless, it is unrealistic to expect the legislature to 
correct “a problem of judge-made” law.62  Inaction from the 
 
evaluate [charitable] immunity . . . .”); Parish, 244 Ark. at 1242, 429 S.W.2d at 47 
(explaining that “it is to the judiciary that the power of government is given to provide 
protection against individual hurt”). 
56. Walt Bennett Ford, Inc. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 274 Ark. 208, 211, 624 
S.W.2d 426, 428 (1981).  While it is not that individuals lack standing to sue hospitals, the 
principle can be analogized to charitable immunity in that, even though individuals may be 
permitted to bring a claim against the hospital at the outset of the case, once charitable 
immunity is granted, the individual cannot sue the hospital for the harm that occurred.  
Individuals are already at a vulnerable state due the injury suffered, and now, granting 
charitable immunity eliminates any protection the judicial system has to offer, thus exposing 
them to distress that is not rightfully placed. 
57. Id., 624 S.W.2d at 428 (recognizing that “the most practical way to protect the 
public interest is to allow [aggrieved parties] to seek judicial review of any alleged wrong”). 
58. See, e.g., Abernathy v. Sisters of St. Mary’s, 446 S.W.2d 599, 606 (Mo. 1969) 
(“The judicial branch of government need not call to, or wait upon, the legislative branch to 
change a rule of law which the judicial branch itself created.”); Noel v. Menninger Found., 
267 P.2d 934, 941 (Kan. 1954) (“[Charitable] immunity . . . was introduced by the courts 
without legislative sanction, and that it is, therefore, for the courts to undo what they have 
themselves brought about.”). 
59. Treiber v. Hess, 301 Ark. 97, 98, 782 S.W.2d 43, 44 (1990). 
60. Thompson v. Sanford, 281 Ark. 365, 369, 663 S.W.2d 932, 935 (1984) (explaining 
that the court abolished municipal immunity after several years of prompting the legislature 
to do so).   
61. Id., 663 S.W.2d at 935 (explaining that shortly after abolishing municipal 
immunity, the legislature established its own public policy stance on the issue). 
62. Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 1242, 429 S.W.2d 45, 46 (1968) (“Despite the 
Court’s invitation for legislative action ten years ago there has quite understandably been no 
comprehensive legislative consideration . . . . It could not realistically be expected that a 
problem of judge-made or ‘lawyers’ law’ could or would be given the necessary time and 
attention by the Legislature.  It operates basically in a sixty-day biennial session, necessarily 
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legislature is not a sufficient justification for the hesitation to 
abrogate a judicially created doctrine that contradicts modern 
public policy.  The Arkansas Supreme Court must abolish 
charitable immunity. 
B. The Role of Precedent 
Although the Arkansas Supreme Court has the authority to 
abolish charitable immunity, another hurdle remains—stare 
decisis.  The court has relied on this fundamental legal principle 
to continue to enforce charitable immunity.63  While stare decisis 
may provide stability and predictability, it is imperative that it not 
overshadow the harsh realities of unsound policy.64  Courts have 
grappled with stare decisis and continue to conclude that when an 
underlying policy no longer exists, neither should the rule of law 
it once supported.65  
Historically, charitable immunity has operated as a rule of 
property.66  Rules of property relate to the law of real estate and 
provide stability in the property title system.67  They 
 
crowded with more pressing and immediate problems of economics, taxation, the allocation 
of the proceeds thereof, and the myriad other interests affecting the general welfare of the 
people of the State.”). 
63. See generally Low v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 364 Ark. 427, 220 S.W.3d 670 (2005). 
64. See Parish, 244 Ark. at 1252, 429 S.W.2d at 52 (“Th[e] policy of adhering to 
precedent to give predictability to the law, and to avoid unsettling things, is fundamental to 
the common law.  So too is the power to overrule a line of decisions, even those under which 
property rights were acquired. . . . Precedent governs until it gives a result so patently wrong, 
so manifestly unjust, that a break becomes unavoidable.  Any rule of law not leading to the 
right result calls for rethinking and perhaps redoing.”). 
65. See, e.g., Kojis v. Drs. Hosp., 107 N.W.2d 131, 133-34 (Wis. 1961) (“The rule of 
stare decisis, however desirable from the standpoint of certainty and stability, does not 
require us to perpetuate a doctrine that should no longer be applicable in view of the changes 
in present day charitable hospitals.”); Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9 (N.Y. 1957) (“If, 
instead, adherence to precedent offers not justice but unfairness, not certainty but doubt and 
confusion, it loses its right to survive, and no principle constrains us to follow it.”). 
66. See, e.g., Low, 364 Ark. at 433-34, 220 S.W.3d at 675 (reiterating charitable 
immunity has been described as a rule of property); Helton v. Sisters of Mercy of St. Joseph’s 
Hosp., 234 Ark. 76, 80-81, 351 S.W.2d 129, 131 (1961) (stating that charitable immunity 
has become a rule of property which should not be disturbed).  
67. Spruill v. Spruill, 241 Ark. 808, 818, 410 S.W.2d 606, 611 (1967) (Fogleman, J., 
dissenting) (Rules of property are “settled legal principle[s] governing the ownership and 
devolution of property[,] . . . the descent, transfer, or sale of property, and the rules which 
affect the title and possession thereto.” (quoting Gibson v. Talley, 206 Ark. 1, 7, 174 S.W.2d 
551, 554 (1943))); Kirkham v. Malone, 232 Ark. 390, 396, 336 S.W.2d 46, 49 (1960) (Rules 
of property govern “the law of real estate . . . . [S]uch rules are based upon technicalities . . . 
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predominately govern real property because, were such rules not 
followed, “chaos . . . would be the result and property values 
would diminish in direct relationship to the degree of instability 
existing in the law of this or any other state as it might be applied 
to real property.”68  Monetary donations, although held in trust, 
are more akin to gifts—that is, personal property—and such a rule 
of property, if prospectively abolished, would not lead to chaos.69  
Further, the court has explicitly stated that other areas of 
immunity do not invoke rules of property because “the law of 
torts does not affect ownership or devolution of title.”70  Thus, 
resorting to stare decisis gives weight to a rule that holds “no great 
weight in the field of tort law.”71  
Precedent should no longer govern when its result is “so 
patently wrong” and “manifestly unjust.”72  Charitable immunity 
is a “rule of law [that does] not lead[] to the right result,” and the 
Arkansas Supreme Court must declare that as so.73  
IV.  THE FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF 
MODERN CHARITIES 
The Arkansas Supreme Court has implied that if 
“compelling public policy” exists, the court would abolish the 
doctrine itself.74  Charitable immunity’s abrogation in other states 
is supported by the transition of the modern hospital to operating 
 
[which] have been continued because of the ever-present need for stability and predictability 
in this field of the law.”). 
68. See Kirkham, 232 Ark. at 396, 336 S.W.2d at 49 (emphasis added). 
69. See Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 1253-54, 429 S.W.2d 45, 52-53 (1968).  
70. Id. at 1253, 429 S.W.2d at 52.  Although devolution of property, such as donations 
or money, are not necessarily involved within municipal immunity, the court still stated that 
they were “not here faced with a rule of property, for the law of torts does not affect 
ownership or devolution of title.  Contracts and wills are not drawn in reliance upon it.”  Id., 
429 S.W.2d at 52.  Aside from the donations received by charitable hospitals, the underlying 
issue relates to tort law, that often being a medical malpractice claim in negligence.   
71. Id., 429 S.W.2d at 52 (stating that “[o]rdinarily then the doctrine of stare decisis is 
of no great weight in the field of tort law”). 
72. Id. at 1252, 429 S.W.2d at 52 (“Precedent governs until it gives a result so patently 
wrong, so manifestly unjust, that a break becomes unavoidable.”). 
73. Id., 429 S.W.2d at 52 (“Any rule of law not leading to the right result calls for 
rethinking and perhaps redoing.”). 
74. Cook v. Wausau Underwriters Ins., 299 Ark. 520, 522, 772 S.W.2d 614, 616 (1989) 
(“Since the legislature has not indicated any intent to overrule our longstanding precedents, 
and we find no compelling public policy reason for doing so, we decline the invitation to 
overrule our prior decisions.” (emphasis added)). 
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as a big business that is fully capable of sustaining tort liability.75  
This compelling public policy has existed for some time, and, 
therefore, the court should abolish charitable immunity in light of 
the modern evolution of charitable hospitals.76 
A. The Business of Charitable Hospitals 
Hospitals and other healthcare related organizations have 
experienced significant growth, accounting for half of all 
charitable organizations and contributing to more than three 
quarters of all charitable expenses.77  The American Hospital 
Association reported that of more than six thousand hospitals, 
almost half are nonprofit—more than both for-profit and state and 
local government hospitals combined.78  
Charitable hospitals impact the economy both directly and 
indirectly and are economic drivers similar to any other 
business—employing hundreds of people, owning vast amounts 
of assets, and operating from increasing revenues yet providing 
little charity care.79  In Arkansas, for-profit and nonprofit 
hospitals combined contribute more than $11 billion of economic 
activity,80 with a direct and indirect economic impact producing 
 
75. See, e.g., Granger v. Deaconess Hosp. of Grand Forks, 138 N.W.2d 443, 448 (N.D. 
1965) (noting that “much of modern charity or philanthropy is ‘big business’ in its field.  It 
therefore has a capacity for absorption of loss which did not exist in the typical nineteenth 
century small hospital or college.”); Mullikin v. Jewish Hosp. Ass’n of Louisville, 348 
S.W.2d 930, 932 (Ky. 1961) (describing charity as “big business” (quoting Parker v. Port 
Huron Hosp., 105 N.W.2d 1, 12 (1960))). 
76.  Albritton v. Neighborhood Ctrs. Ass’n for Child Dev., 466 N.E.2d 867, 871 (Ohio 
1984) (“[T]his court not only has the power but the duty . . . to evaluate [charitable immunity] 
in light of reason, logic and the actions and functions of the relevant entities in the twentieth 
century.”). 
77. GEORGE MORRIS ET AL., THE FINANCIAL HEALTH OF THE UNITED STATES 
NONPROFIT SECTOR: FACTS AND OBSERVATIONS 4 (2018), [https://perma.cc/RU2S-4SEL] 
(“Hospitals, Health and Human Services . . . , and Educational Institution nonprofits account 
for nearly half of the organizations in the sector and 80% of its expenditures.”). 
78. AM. HOSP. ASS’N, FAST FACTS ON US HOSPITALS (2020), [https://perma.cc/6SSC-
TNEC] [hereinafter AHA, FAST FACTS].  
79. AM. HOSP. ASS’N, HOSPITALS ARE ECONOMIC ANCHORS IN THEIR COMMUNITIES 
(2018), [https://perma.cc/6AYU-WPUA] (“Hospitals[] [e]mploy nearly 5.9 million people[;] 
[a]re one of the top sources of private-sector jobs[;] [and] [p]urchase $903 billion in goods 
and services from other businesses. . . . [This] create[s] additional economic value for the 
community. Overall, hospitals[] [s]upport 16.5 million total jobs, or one of 9 jobs, in the U.S. 
[and] [s]upport almost $3.0 trillion in economic activity.”). 
80. See ARK HOSP. ASS’N, 2019 GUIDE TO HOSPITAL STATISTICS 35, 44-45 (2019), 
[https://perma.cc/XMU8-2T3N] [hereinafter ARK. HOSP. ASS’N, 2019 STATISTICS]. 
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almost 90,000 jobs.81  As one article described it, “[t]he standard 
nonprofit hospital doesn’t act like a charity any more than 
Microsoft does — they also give some stuff away for free.”82 Like 
any other business, charitable hospitals should be held 
accountable for their negligence.  
When the Arkansas Supreme Court abolished municipal 
immunity, it likened municipalities to corporate bodies—the 
same is true for modern hospitals.83  In any corporation that is 
well-run, tort liability should be a small expense.84  Should it be 
otherwise, tort liability benefits the public safety and public 
knowledge by exposing continued tortious conduct.  In addition, 
it is likely that such an expense could be minimized because, like 
other businesses, charitable hospitals have the same avenues of 
law in court.85  Thus, it is reasonable to require that charitable 
hospitals pay all of their expenses, including those which may 
arise from tort judgments.86 
Hospitals provide immense assistance to individuals and 
families by providing medical care to the suffering and 
contributing to overall health and education.  However, while 
charitable institutions are classified as not-for-profit, significant 
attention is given to operating them at a profit.87  More often than 
 
81. Id. 
82. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Benefits Questioned in Tax Breaks for Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 17, 2013, at A18, [https://perma.cc/7VKL-YRV6] [hereinafter Rosenthal, Benefits 
Questioned] (questioning the value of the tax exemptions that many nonprofit hospitals take 
advantage of because of their charitable status, which has been a growing debate among 
health care management, regulators, and politicians). 
83. See Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 1247, 429 S.W.2d 45, 49 (1968) 
(“[M]unicipalities are . . . corporate bodies, capable of much the same acts as private 
corporations . . . .”). 
84. See id. at 1248, 429 S.W.2d at 49 (“In the private sector tort liability is a small item 
in the budget of any well run enterprise and should prove to be proportionately no greater 
for the municipality . . . .”). 
85. See id., 429 S.W.2d at 49-50 (explaining that tort liability should prove to be a 
small expense because businesses “have available to [them] the same defenses and means of 
spreading the risk”). 
86. See Mullikin v. Jewish Hosp. Ass’n of Louisville, 348 S.W.2d 930, 932 (Ky. 1961) 
(“Charit[able] [hospitals] today [are] a large-scale operation with salaries, costs and other 
expenses similar to business generally.  It makes sense to say that this kind of charity should 
pay its own way, not only as to its office expenses but as to the expense of insurance to pay 
for torts as well.” (quoting Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 105 N.W.2d 1, 13 (1960))). 
87. Rabon v. Rowan Mem’l Hosp. Inc., 152 S.E.2d 485, 499 (N.C. 1967) (stating that 
“[e]ven though public hospitals are not operated for private gain, every effort is made to 
operate them at a [p]rofit”). 
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not, the “commitment to charity is dwarfed by [the] preoccupation 
with profits.”88   
1. Revenue 
Despite the idea that paying damages would negatively 
impact the continued operation of charitable hospitals, both the 
number of charitable hospitals and their revenues have 
substantially increased across all states, even those that have 
abrogated charitable immunity long ago.89  Of the registered 1.5 
million nonprofit organizations, the health sector accounts for 
more than 50% of overall growth, and much of the revenue 
reported was in the form of patient charges and government 
grants.90  
Since 1999, the number of hospitals has experienced 
approximately a 5% growth—increasing from 4,956 to 5,198.91  
Notably, by 1999 most states had already abolished the doctrine, 
yet overall, the hospital industry has expanded.92  Neither the 
number of hospitals, nor their viability, has been negatively 
impacted in states that have abrogated charitable immunity.93  
 
88. Rosenthal, Benefits Questioned, supra note 82. 
89. See AHA, FAST FACTS, supra note 78 and accompanying text; see also Flagiello 
v. Pa. Hosp., 208 A.2d 193, 197 (Pa. 1965) (“According to one who has made a study of the 
[increase in hospitals], there were only 178 hospitals in the United States in 1873.  Since 
then, hospitals have been growing in number, size, expansion and service.  Entering a 
hospital was at one time regarded with a measure of awe.  Doing so now has become almost 
a commonplace occurrence, although a highly beneficial one.” (footnote omitted)). 
90.  See Brice S. McKeever, The Nonprofit Sector in Brief 2018, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
CHARITABLE STATS. (Dec. 13, 2018) [https://perma.cc/4CH8-MKJ7] (“Approximately 1.56 
million nonprofits were registered with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in 2015, an 
increase of 10.4 percent from 2005.”); I.R.S., STATISTICS OF INCOME: CHARITIES AND 
OTHER TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, TAX YEAR 2015 (2018), [https://perma.cc/Q9KQ-
LWB6] [hereinafter I.R.S., STATISTICS OF INCOME] (“Over 73 percent of revenue reported 
by charitable organizations on Form 990 came from program services, which include 
payments to organizations in the form of tuition, patient charges, admission fees, etc. . . . 
Contributions, gifts, and grants comprised the other major sources of charitable revenue.  
While many contributions came from the public . . . well over half were in the form of 
government grants.”); McKeever, supra (“The growth for the health sector, $343.3 billion, 
accounts for over three-fifths of the growth of the entire nonprofit sector between 2005 and 
2015 ($554.6 billion).”). 
91. State Health Facts: Total Hospitals, KAISER FAM. FOUND., 
[https://perma.cc/KRF8-E4XN] (last visited Feb. 22, 2020).  
92. Id.; supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
93. See supra note 91 and accompanying text; infra note 95. 
2021 CHARITABLE IMMUNITY IN ARKANSAS 17 
Immunity does not improve a hospital’s ability to function or 
progress, it only hinders an individual’s right to be made whole. 
Further, although hospitals file a small percentage of 
charitable tax returns, they are amongst the class of organizations 
that account for nearly 90% of the entire charitable sector’s 
revenue.94  Hospital revenues significantly increased in the last 
decade “from $689.3 billion in 2005 to $977.1 billion in 2015,” 
experiencing “the largest dollar growth of” the charitable 
industry.95  
In Arkansas, revenues from various charitable hospitals 
range from $16.7 million to $896.5 million, while expenses 
average from $17 million to $884.1 million.96  Although not all 
hospitals operate at a significant profit when compared to other 
companies, there is still no evidence to substantiate the notion that 
the number of charitable hospitals will decrease by imposing full 
liability.97  Quite the contrary, as noted above, charitable hospitals 
are increasing and thriving despite being subject to tort liability.98  
Thus, courts should not accept that hospitals could not financially 
sustain tort liability.   
 
 
94. See I.R.S., STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 90 (“Large organizations, especially 
hospitals and universities, dominated the financial activity of the charitable sector.  Charities 
with assets over $10 million filed only 8 percent of the returns for Tax Year 2015, but they 
accounted for . . . 87 percent of revenue reported.  While small charities filed nearly 60 
percent of returns, they represented a negligible amount of the sector’s financial holdings 
and activity.”). 
95. See McKeever, supra note 90 (“Revenues for hospitals and primary care facilities, 
in particular, increased from $689.3 billion in 2005 to $977.1 billion in 2015 after adjusting 
for inflation, by far the largest dollar growth of any subsector during this period.”). 
96. See Baptist Health, HOSPITALFINANCES.ORG, [https://perma.cc/6SV4-VW43] 
(last visited February 20, 2020) [hereinafter Baptist Health]; St. Bernards Community 
Hospital, HOSPITALFINANCES.ORG, [https://perma.cc/V3UC-L9DN] (last visited Feb. 20, 
2020) [hereinafter St. Bernards Community Hospital]. 
97. See Granger v. Deaconess Hosp. of Grand Forks, 138 N.W.2d 443, 447 (N.D. 
1965) (“There are also reasons which take force away from the fears of dissipation and 
deterrence of donations. No statistical evidence has been presented to show that the mortality 
or crippling of charities has been greater in states which impose full or partial liability than 
where complete or substantially full immunity is given.”). 
98. Id. at 447-48 (“Charities seem to survive and increase in both [states that have and 
do not have charitable immunity], with little apparent heed to whether they are liable for torts 
or difference in survival capacity.”). 
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2. Assets 
The modern charitable hospital engages in activities and has 
resources never contemplated when immunity was first 
established.99  Hospitals operate with substantial capital and 
invest billions of dollars in assets including real estate and 
medical equipment.  Of a total of $90.7 billion dollars invested in 
the healthcare sector, approximately $56.7 billion is attributed to 
hospital investments.100  The average hospital spends a significant 
amount of their budget on technology investments alone, and this 
is only expected to increase.101  
Hospital real estate business has become its own subsector 
of the real estate industry. While hospitals continuously expand 
their “off-campus medical practices and other facilities,” they 
also lease, rent, or partner with real estate investment trusts, 
which produces various streams of income.102  And still, other 
hospitals are monetizing their real estate by undergoing mergers 
and acquisitions or allowing outside investment, thus providing 
another income stream.103  
 
99. See Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 1247, 429 S.W.2d 45, 49 (1968) (describing the 
historic changes in operations of municipalities as “engag[ing] in fields of activity . . . never 
dreamed of in 1788, when this doctrine was first set forth”). 
100. Margaret Patrick, Analyzing Hospital Expenses: Breaking Down the Important 
Costs, MKT. REALIST (Dec. 12, 2019, 5:45 PM), [https://perma.cc/JB5G-BAZK] 
[hereinafter Analyzing Hospital Expenses] (“Hospitals are a capital-intensive business with 
substantial investments in real estate, skilled labor, and medical equipment. According to an 
annual capital survey for 2012 by the U.S. Census Bureau, out of the $90.7 billion invested 
in the healthcare sector, $56.7 billion was invested in the hospital industry. . . . A total of 
$47.9 billion was invested in structures and $42.8 billion in equipment in the healthcare 
sector. . . . [H]uge investments [are] at stake . . . .”).  
101. See generally HEALTH F. & FIRST AM. HEALTHCARE FIN., EXPECTATIONS FOR 
QUALITY & COMPLIANCE IMPROVEMENT DRIVING STRONG TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT BY 
HOSPITALS (2016), [https://perma.cc/76LN-U5ML]; see also Margaret Patrick, 
Understanding Hospitals’ Size, Technology, and Operating Expenses, MKT. REALIST (Nov. 
26, 2019, 10:36 PM) [https://perma.cc/5RW9-ADST] (“According to a survey . . . by the 
American Hospital Association . . . , technology investments are expensive.  The median 
annual capital investment is $7,00,000 [sic] . . . .”). 
102. Susan Morse, Hospital Chains Make Big Money in Real Estate by Unloading 
Properties, HEALTHCARE FIN. (May 13, 2015), [https://perma.cc/776S-A2YN] (“[M]ore 
common is for healthcare organizations to partner with real estate investment trusts . . . . 
REITs are strong income producers, paying out at least 90 percent of their taxable income in 
the form of dividends to shareholders.”). 
103. See Kelly M. Blumline et al., 6 Key Trends Affecting Healthcare Real Estate in 
2017, BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Feb. 23, 2017), [https://perma.cc/5CR5-WZAE] (“In the last 
decade, healthcare real estate has become a more widely recognized asset class by both the 
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Despite filing only 8% of total charitable tax returns, 
charitable hospitals contributed to 93% of the total assets 
reported.104  In Arkansas, charitable hospitals report total assets 
ranging from almost $5.8 million to more than $1.2 billion.105  
Hospitals are creating alternate streams of income, demonstrating 
that immunity is no longer necessary to ensure their continued 
existence because hospitals are among the “[l]arge organizations” 
that “dominate[] the financial activity of the chari-table 
sector.”106  
The expensive costs of new buildings and equipment 
arguably proves that if hospitals have not experienced bankruptcy 
because of such costs, it is unlikely that bankruptcy would occur 
should liability become a potential expense.107  The vast variety 
and size of assets does not reflect negatively on the business of a 
hospital, as it is more a reflection of economic change; however, 
it is evidence that charitable hospitals are fully capable of being 
held liable for an injury they cause.108  Charitable immunity’s 
operation in the law no longer reflects how charitable hospitals 
operate in modern life.  
3. Financial Funding 
Charitable immunity once provided hospitals a way to 
maintain their operations while providing care to low-income 
patients.109  However, increases in state and federal funding now 
 
domestic and international investment community. . . . [M]any health systems and physician 
groups have elected to ‘monetize’ their real estate assets.”); Morse, supra note 102.  
104. See I.R.S., STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 90 (“Charities with assets over $10 
million filed only 8 percent of the returns for Tax Year 2015, but they accounted for 93 
percent of the assets . . . . While small charities filed nearly 60 percent of returns, they 
represented a negligible amount of the sector’s financial holdings and activity.”). 
105.  See Baptist Health, supra note 96; St. Bernards Community Hospital, supra note 
96.  
106. I.R.S., STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 90 (“Large organizations, especially 
hospitals . . . dominated the financial activity of the chari-table sector.”). 
107. See generally Analyzing Hospital Expenses, supra note 100 (“Hospitals are a 
capital-intensive business with substantial investments in real estate, skilled labor, and 
medical equipment.  According to an annual capital survey for 2012 by the U.S. Census 
Bureau, out of the $90.7 billion invested in the healthcare sector, $56.7 billion was invested 
in the hospital industry. . . . A total of $47.9 billion was invested in structures and $42.8 
billion in equipment in the healthcare sector.”). 
108. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
109. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.  
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offer ample resources.110  While some charitable organizations 
are funded primarily by donations, the modern hospital is 
financed predominately by “government contracts and fee-based 
services.”111  
The National Health Expenditure Projections for 2018-2027 
predicts that the uninsured population will decrease from 2013-
2016 then increase from 2018-2027, but that the total share of the 
insured population will remain at approximately 90%.112  This 
makes it more likely that patients will be able to provide payment 
for services, resulting in consistent revenue for the hospital and 
the ability to obtain credit and utilize debt for operations and 
expansions.113   
While government funds have increased for hospitals, 
donations remain a small contribution, thus pushing against the 
notion that those funds given for a charitable purpose should not 
be used to satisfy a judgment.114  Historically, donations were 
predominately made by private individuals.115  Today, most of the 
(relatively few) donations are provided by corporate donors to 
corporate hospitals.116  Comparatively, health related 
organizations receive about 9% of total annual private giving.117  
Although slightly higher than donations to charities involving the 
 
110. Cf. Andrea M. Sisko et al., National Health Expenditure Projections, 2018–27: 
Economic and Demographic Trends Drive Spending and Enrollment Growth, 38 HEALTH 
AFFS. 491, 492-93 (2019) (demonstrating an increase in national health expenditures at both 
the state and federal level). 
111. See MORRIS ET AL., supra note 77, at 5 (“For example, Religious Institutions and 
Environment & Animal-related nonprofits are predominantly funded by philanthropy, 
whereas Educational Institutions, Hospitals, and Health and Human Services receive the vast 
majority of their funding from government contracts and fee-based services.  Larger 
nonprofits generally receive very little of their funding – at least in percentage terms – from 
philanthropy.”). 
112. See Sisko et al., supra note 110, at 493-94. 
113. See MORRIS ET AL., supra note 77, at 7 (“Nonprofits reliant on government 
contracts and fee-for-service revenue . . . use debt more often . . . [and have] greater access 
to credit from banks or the debt capital markets. . . . [Whereas [n]onprofits more reliant on 
private philanthropy . . . have less debt . . . .”). 
114. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.  Cf. Mullikin v. Jewish Hosp. Ass’n 
of Louisville, 348 S.W.2d 930, 930, 932-33 (Ky. 1961).  
115. Mullikin, 348 S.W.2d at 932-33 (“[Historically,] [m]ost gifts to charity were 
private, not corporate. . . . [Now charity] often is corporate both in the identity of the donor 
and in the identity of the donee who administers the charity.” (quoting Parker v. Port Huron 
Hosp., 105 N.W.2d 1, 12 (1960))). 
116. See id. 
117. McKeever, supra note 90 (table 5 demonstrates the change in charitable giving 
across the nonprofit sector from 2012-2017). 
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arts and the environment, it is considerably lower than 
contributions made to religion and education, at 30.9% and 
14.3%, respectively.118  
Unfortunately, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 changed 
the tax deductions for charitable donations.119  The result has been 
a significant decrease in charitable giving, which is likely to 
continue.120  In one year, contributions made by individuals 
decreased by six percent of the total U.S. GDP.121  Consequently, 
with fewer individuals making contributions, donative intent is 
less and less relevant and should not play a role in determining 
liability.  The corporate nature of the contributions and of the 
recipients alter the expectation of how monies should be utilized 
and who should be held accountable for their actions.  
Finally, the widespread availability of hospital liability 
insurance negates the argument that paying damages would 
diminish hospital revenues from something other than charitable 
purposes.122  Liability insurance would likely cover the cost of 
any injury and, if not, the modern hospital has income from 
sources such as investments and rent that can offset nearly any 
liability expense.123  Although procuring insurance coverage 
would reduce some amount of revenue, it likely would not be 
financially ruinous for a hospital’s operations because the cost of 
liability insurance is barely over one percent of all expenses.124  
Thus, the increased financial burden is associated with the 
 
118. Id. 
119.  JANE G. GRAVELLE ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45922, TAX ISSUES RELATING 
TO CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS (2020), 
 [https://perma.cc/P3P8-39CV] (“Changes in the tax revision enacted in late 2017, popularly 
known as the Tax Cut[s] and Jobs Act[,] . . . while not generally aimed at charitable 
deductions, reduced the scope of the tax benefit for charitable giving. A higher standard 
deduction and the limit on the deduction for state and local taxes caused more individuals to 
take the standard deduction, as opposed to itemizing deductions.  As a result, many 
individuals who were able to deduct charitable contributions no longer claim this itemized 
deduction.  Other changes exempted more estates from the estate tax, eliminating the benefit 
of deducting charitable contributions in these cases.  Concerns have arisen that these changes 
are expected to lead to a reduction in charitable contributions.”).  
120. See id. at 1.  
121. Id. at 27. 
122. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 27, § 895E cmt. c.  
123. See The Quality of Mercy, supra note 4, at 1395.  
124. See AM. HOSP. ASS’N, TRENDWATCH CHARTBOOK 2018: TRENDS AFFECTING 
HOSPITALS AND HEALTH SYSTEMS 59 (2018), [https://perma.cc/2E6T-PYAQ] (chart 6.10 
shows the small percentage of total expenses attributed to the cost of liability insurance). 
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reasonable protection that comes from the cost of insurance, not 
the cost of damages.125  The protections of charitable immunity 
are overbroad and cover expenses that typical liability insurance 
can, and ought, to cover.  
4. Tax Breaks (With Little to Show for It) 
Charitable institutions not only benefit from increased 
revenue and government funding, but also take advantage of 
significant tax breaks as tax exempt organizations under section 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.126  Providing charity care 
is one way to satisfy the “community benefit standard” to meet 
the charitable purpose requirement,127 which means that the 
hospital must provide some sort of health benefit to the 
community, among other things.128  
What constitutes charity care is controversial amongst 
policymakers, which has caused a disparity between the actual 
charitable benefits provided to the public and the advantages that 
charitable hospitals reap from tax exemption.129  There is 
generally no specific requirement for how much charity care must 
 
125. Granger v. Deaconess Hosp. of Grand Forks, 138 N.W.2d 443, 448 (N.D. 1965) 
(“What is at stake, so far as the charity is concerned, is the cost of reasonable protection, the 
amount of the insurance premium as an added burden on its finances, not the awarding over 
in damages of its entire assets.”). 
126. See generally Charitable Hospitals - General Requirements for Tax-Exemption 
Under Section 501(c)(3), IRS, [https://perma.cc/N5PE-KUL5] (last updated Sept. 19, 2020).  
Hospitals can be classified as tax exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue 
Code if they are “organized or operated exclusively for exempt purposes,” which include 
“religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational” objectives.  Id.  
127. MARCO A. VILLAGRANA ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10918, HOSPITAL 
CHARITY CARE AND RELATED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER MEDICARE AND THE 
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (2018), [https://perma.cc/E3TB-YEJS] (“A nonprofit hospital 
applying for, or seeking to maintain, tax-exempt status as a ‘charitable’ organization under 
IRC Section 501(c)(3) must meet a ‘community benefit standard’ developed by the IRS. . . . 
One way hospitals may demonstrate that they have met the community benefit standard is 
by providing charity care.”). 
128. Id. (“Generally, [the community benefit] standard requires the hospital to show 
that it has provided benefits that promote the health of a broad class of persons to the 
community.”); see also JAMES J. FISHMAN ET AL., NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 301, 303 (5th ed. 2015).  To qualify as a not-for-profit hospital, the hospital 
must not benefit private interests and must hold an open emergency room.  Id.  
129. See generally Rosenthal, Benefits Questioned, supra note 82 (questioning the 
value of the tax exemptions that many nonprofit hospitals take advantage of because of their 
charitable status, which has been a growing debate among health care management, 
regulators, and politicians).  
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be provided, making it easy for hospitals to benefit from tax-
exempt status with little to show for it.130 
For example, the IRS permits hospitals to provide charity 
care through financial assistance policies.131  While most 
charitable hospitals have some sort of policy, most hospitals fail 
to notify patients of their eligibility.132  Moreover, the hospital has 
discretion in defining charity care as prescribed by their own 
internal policy.133  Thus, the Arkansas Supreme Court is being 
misled by arbitrary numbers and policies described in the 
charities’ documents.  While the taxation of charities is largely 
out of the realm of the justice system, it is not so that reality can 
be ignored by the black robes.  
Despite the Arkansas Supreme Court’s insistence on 
charitable funds not being diverted for other purposes, the court 
is being deceived by what may be reported as charity care.134  No 
longer are the days of traditional charity care defined by partially 
discounted or free services.135  Instead, the IRS permits hospitals 
to broadly define charity to include health care insurance losses, 
hosting community health fairs, conducting research, and even 
“‘donating’ their executives’ time to serve on local community 
boards.”136  But even these activities are less charitable than 
expected.  
 
130. See VILLAGRANA ET AL., supra note 127 (“There are no bright-line numerical 
thresholds for determining whether a hospital meets the legal requirements for 501(c)(3) 
status . . . . [N]o specific amount reported [to the IRS], by itself, [is] sufficient evidence of 
compliance . . . .”). 
131. See id. (“The Medicare Provider Reimbursement Manual instructions for the S-
10 worksheet define charity care as resulting ‘from a hospital’s policy to provide all or a 
portion of services free of charge to patients who meet the hospital’s charity care policy or 
financial assistance policy (FAP).’ This includes full or partial discounts.”). 
132. Bradley Herring et al., Comparing the Value of Nonprofit Hospitals’ Tax 
Exemption to Their Community Benefits, 55 J. HEALTH CARE ORG., PROVISION, & FIN. 1, 9 
(2018) [https://perma.cc/65GB-GR3J] (“The cost of the hospital’s financial assistance policy 
is what the IRS defines as the hospital’s charity care on Schedule H. . . . [E]xamin[ing] 
compliance in 2012 with these provisions . . . [demonstrates] that while almost all have 
established financial assistance policies, just under half notified patients of their eligibility 
. . . .”). 
133. See VILLAGRANA ET AL., supra note 127 (“[W]hat constitutes charity care under 
Medicare is largely determined by an individual hospital’s charity care policy . . . .”). 
134. See, e.g., Fairchild, supra note 11. 
135. See Rosenthal, Benefits Questioned, supra note 82. 
136. Id. (“[T]he I.R.S. allows hospitals to use broad definitions of community service, 
including the value of traditional charity — care dispensed free or at a discount to those who 
cannot pay — and the money hospitals calculate they lose because Medicaid reimburses 
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Research can be, and often is, funded by various national 
institutes and drug companies, and community health fairs and 
other activities are likened to advertising and marketing for the 
hospital.137  Of course, these things should not be undervalued 
because they do benefit community health—but at what cost?  
Almost $25 billion and victims experiencing compounded 
suffering.138  
The total amount of charity care provided is insignificant 
compared to the other expenses of a charitable hospital.139  While 
the value of charity care given by tax-exempt hospitals is 
significantly more than that given by for-profit hospitals, the cost 
of care viewed as a percentage of operating expenses and total 
expenses is not substantially different.140  In addition, the 
community benefit standards that dictate whether a hospital can 
be classified as not-for-profit are also “generally provided by . . . 
for-profit[]” hospitals.141  Consequently, charity care provided 
compared to a hospital’s operating expenses and total expenses 
has decreased by approximately 23%.142  
Comparing the charity care and community benefit of 
various charitable hospitals in Arkansas demonstrates that 
charitable activity is a negligible expense by hospital accounting 
 
them less than their costs.  Hospitals can also take credit for hosting health fairs, operating 
some research labs and ‘donating’ their executives’ time to serve on local community 
boards.”). 
137. See Michael A. Morrisey et al., Do Nonprofit Hospitals Pay Their Way?, 15 
HEALTH AFFS. 132, 134 (1996) (“Hospitals may provide other community dividends such 
as teaching, research, preventive services, and primary care in underserved areas. . . .  
Substantial amounts of research are funded by the National Institutes of Health, drug 
companies, and other entities.  The provision of screening and preventive services may be 
more akin to marketing efforts than to true community dividends.”). 
138. Sara Rosenbaum et al., The Value of the Nonprofit Hospital Tax Exemption Was 
$24.6 Billion in 2011, 34 HEALTH AFFS. 1225, 1225 (2015); see supra note 29 and 
accompanying text.  
139. I.R.S., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON PRIVATE TAX-
EXEMPT, TAXABLE, AND GOVERNMENT-OWNED HOSPITALS 4 (2018), 
[https://perma.cc/E5VE-XJWJ] [hereinafter I.R.S., REPORT TO CONGRESS]. 
140. Id.  As a percentage of operating expenses, for-profit hospitals’ cost of charity 
care is 0.94% while not-for profit hospitals’ cost is 1.64%.  Id.  As a percentage of total 
expenses, for-profit hospitals’ cost of charity care is 0.93% while not-for-profit hospitals’ is 
1.62%.  Id.  
141. See Herring et al., supra note 132, at 9 (“[N]either combined community benefits 
nor charity care alone (whether measured as totals or incremental amounts relative to for-
profits) is strongly correlated with the value of the tax exemption . . . .”). 
142.  I.R.S., REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 139, at 10. 
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metrics.  Overall, charity care provided by Arkansas hospitals has 
declined by almost half.143  In Arkansas, as a percentage of total 
expenses, charity care ranges from 0.29% to 2.33%, while other 
community benefits range from 0.0% to 1.01%.144  Thus, despite 
the name “charitable” hospital, charity care does not overtake 
their budget.  
Further, nonprofit hospitals obtain several significant tax 
advantages, including avoiding federal or state corporate income 
tax, state sales tax, or local property taxes, amounting to more 
than $12 billion in 2002 and having since more than doubled to 
approximately $25 billion.145  Although some charitable hospitals 
provide charity care that justifies their tax advantages, others do 
not.146  Data “indicate[s] that the difference between the value of 
charity care alone and the value of the tax exemption averages 
−3.72% of total expenses” while benefits from the tax exemption 
average about 5.87% of expenses.147  While the tax exemption 
may be justified in some cases, the legal exemption is not.  Tax-
exempt status combined with immunity from tort liability does 
not account for the little cost of charity care actually provided.   
The minimal amount of charity care provided arguably 
demonstrates that perhaps the public is not benefitting from the 
funds held in trust.  Not only are taxpayers not reaping the benefits 
of their contributions, they are also being penalized further by 
allowing hospitals to escape liability for their own actions.  Thus, 
 
143.  ARK. HOSP. ASS’N, 2019 STATISTICS, supra note 80, at 47 (noting the decrease 
in charitable care from 2013 to 2017). 
144. See White River Health System Inc., HOSPITALFINANCES.ORG, 
[https://perma.cc/HWE4-NGHB] (last visited Feb. 20, 2020); St. Bernards Community 
Hospital, supra note 96; Baptist Health, supra note 96. 
145. See Rosenbaum et al., supra note 138, at 1225 (“The congressional Joint 
Committee on Taxation estimated the value of the nonprofit hospital tax exemption at $12.6 
billion in 2002 . . . . [T]he size of the exemption reached $24.6 billion in 2011.”); see also 
Morrisey et al., supra note 137, at 132 (“Nonprofit . . . hospitals . . . have long enjoyed 
favorable tax treatment.  As 501(c)(3) organizations under the federal tax code, they are 
exempt from federal corporate income taxes.  Similarly, states exempt them from state 
income taxes.  Nonprofit hospitals typically are exempt from local property taxes and have 
access to tax-exempt debt.  Tax-exempt debt allows hospitals to borrow money at rates that 
are typically two to three percentage points below those paid by equally risky enterprises.”).  
146. See Rosenthal, Benefits Questioned, supra note 82 (“A study . . . in The New 
England Journal of Medicine found that hospitals spent an average of 7.5 percent of their 
operating costs on charity care and community benefit . . . . Some spent under 1 percent and 
others about 20 percent.”). 
147. Herring et al., supra note 132, at 7, 9 (“The average direct and indirect benefits of 
the tax exemption equal 5.87% of total expenses.”). 
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type of business organization should neither “nullify liability 
altogether” nor “leave the burden of negligent injury to be borne 
exclusively by the victim.”148 
V.  CHARITABLE IMMUNITY’S MISPLACEMENT IN 
THE LAW 
A consistently reiterated reason for granting charitable 
immunity to hospitals has been the policy that the funds donated 
would not align with the purpose for which they were given 
should such funds be utilized to pay damages of a judgment.149  
However, this reasoning is flawed.  
A. The Charitable Purpose 
Historically, the financial needs of charitable hospitals were 
“poorly satisfied,”150 and it made sense to limit the use of 
monetary gifts to specifically charitable purposes rather than the 
satisfaction of damages.151  However, as explained above, 
contributions are a small portion of income, while government 
funding and insurance, for both the hospital and the patient, have 
increased.152  What remains are two considerations—the right of 
individuals to seek redress from negligence and the right of the 
charitable organization to use its monies for charitable 
purposes.153  
 
148. See Albritton v. Neighborhood Ctrs. Ass’n for Child Dev., 466 N.E.2d 867, 869 
(Ohio 1984) (“The form of legal organization may affect where liability is ultimately placed.  
But, in general, it does not nullify liability altogether and does not leave the burden of 
negligent injury to be borne exclusively by the victim.”). 
149. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
150. See Mullikin v. Jewish Hosp. Ass’n of Louisville, 348 S.W.2d 930, 932 (Ky. 
1961) (“Charitable needs were always poorly satisfied.”). 
151. See id. (“It made sense in that period to hold that all gifts to charity should go to 
the purposes for which they were given, and not to outsiders who were by accident injured 
in the administration of the charity.”).  
152. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.  
153. See Albritton, 466 N.E.2d at 870 (“[I]t has been determined that the benefit to 
society as a whole from protecting charitable organizations outweighs the detriment to any 
one particular injured individual. . . . [The] resolution of such a question involves a balancing 
of two rights.  On the one hand is the right of charitable organizations to any benefit and 
assistance which society can justly allow them.  On the other hand is the right of an 
individual, injured by the negligence of another, to seek compensation.”). 
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Arguably, all monies received and expended are for the 
purpose of the charity without reference to how they are received.  
Whether it be spent on infrastructure, technology, research, 
salaries, or electricity, the money generated is put towards 
hospital operations.  Granting hospitals immunity seems to place 
greater protection on the cash held in their trust accounts rather 
than individual human rights, “thus favoring property rights over 
personal rights.”154  
The Arkansas Supreme Court has quoted authority stating 
that charitable trusts are made for the purpose of benefitting the 
public at large and include those gifts given “for the relief and 
comfort of the poor, the sick, and the afflicted.”155  Therefore, 
should a hospital negligently injure one of its patients—that is, 
someone of the public who comes in to benefit from such 
charitable care—those funds donated to the charity could be a 
source of funds used to satisfy a tort judgment.  While 
contributions were perhaps made for care and not reimbursement 
for harm, the funds should at least be made available to make 
injured patients whole. 
 The court’s view on the charitable purpose for which funds 
may be used is too limited.  Should a hospital negligently harm a 
patient who is thereafter unable to support themselves, the 
hospital’s funds could be utilized to provide charity to the injured 
patient.  While this may not be the typical understanding of 
charity care, it is still charity care.  The public interest would be 
better served by holding hospitals accountable and reducing the 
suffering of the individual. 
B. In Opposition to Tort Law 
Charitable immunity “proves itself an instrument of 
injustice”156 from the general rule of liability for wrongdoing, and 
 
154. See Garlington v. Kingsley, 289 So. 2d 88, 92 (La. 1974) (“Charitable immunity, 
although apparently created as a public policy to encourage charities, actually violates the 
general public policy because it affords great protection to trust funds and certain other 
properties, thus favoring property rights over personal rights.”). 
155. Woman’s Christian Nat’l Libr. Ass’n v. Fordyce, 79 Ark. 532, 537, 86 S.W. 417, 
418 (1904) (quoting 2 Perry on Trusts, § 687).  
156. Flagiello v. Pa. Hosp., 208 A.2d 193, 206 (Pa. 1965) (“The charitable immunity 
rule proves itself an instrument of injustice and nothing presented . . . shows it to be 
otherwise.  In fact, the longer the argument for its preservation the more convincing is the 
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immunity the exception.157  “Tort law [seeks] to reconcile the 
policy of letting accidents lie where they fall, . . . giving 
reasonable freedom of action . . . and protection [to] the 
individual from injury which the [hospital] had a reasonable 
opportunity to avoid . . . .”158  Among the traditional goals of tort 
law are compensation and deterrence, neither of which charitable 
immunity adequately satisfies.159  The cost to the victim is the full 
burden of the injury, while the cost to the hospital, whether moral 
or financial, is minimal.  
Charitable immunity, in its current state in Arkansas, results 
in “immunity from suit, not . . . immunity from liability.”160  
Immunity from suit means that charitable hospitals are free from 
standing trial.161  In contrast, immunity from liability is merely a 
defense to a lawsuit.162  Thus, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
permits charitable hospitals to be “completely immune from 
suit[,] and [they] cannot be named as a defendant.”163  Although 
Arkansas does have a direct action statute, which allows an 
individual to have a cause of action against the hospital’s “insurer 
regardless of the fact that the actual tortfeasor may not be sued,” 
because the liability is the hospital’s, neither accountability for 
harm nor deterrence from future harm are accomplished.164  
 
proof that it long ago outlived its purpose if, indeed, it ever had a purpose consonant with 
sound law.”); see also Noel v. Menninger Found., 267 P.2d 934, 942 (Kan. 1954) (“It is a 
general principle that for negligent or tortious conduct, liability is the rule.  Immunity is the 
exception to the rule, created by the courts which have applied it.  The law’s emphasis is 
ordinarily on liability, not immunity for wrongdoing.  The immunity of charitable 
corporations for torts is based upon very dubious grounds.  It would seem that a sound social 
policy ought, in fact, to require such organizations to make just compensation for harm 
legally caused by their activities, under the same circumstances as individuals before they 
carry on their charitable activities.  All persons, organizations and corporations stand on an 
equality before the law.  All should be bound alike or excused alike.”). 
157. See Noel, 267 P.2d at 942.  
158. Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 1246-47, 429 S.W.2d 45, 49 (1968) (“Tort law is 
intended to reconcile the policy of letting accidents lie where they fall, thereby giving 
reasonable freedom of action to others, and protection of the individual from injury which 
the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to avoid at the time.”). 
159. Lisa A. Podewils, Traditional Tort Principles and Wrongful Conception Child-
Rearing Damages, 73 B.U.L. REV. 407, 418 (1993). 
160. Davis Nursing Ass’n v. Neal, 2019 Ark. 91, at 5, 570 S.W.3d 457, 460 (2019). 
161. Id., 570 S.W.3d at 460. 
162. Id., 570 S.W.3d at 460. 
163. Scamardo v. Sparks Reg’l Med. Ctr., 375 Ark. 300, 304, 289 S.W.3d 903, 906 
(2008).  
164. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-210(a)(3) (2007) (“The insurer shall be directly 
liable to the injured person, firm, or corporation for damages to the extent of the coverage in 
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Immunity tends to foster neglect,165 demonstrated by 
findings from Leapfrog, an organization that grades hospitals 
based on performance measures from various national data 
sources.166 “[S]tates are ranked based on the number of ‘A’ 
[graded] hospitals they have compared to the total number of 
graded hospitals . . . .”167  In Fall 2019, Arkansas was ranked 
number forty-two out of the fifty states with only 13.79% of 
Arkansas hospitals obtaining an “A” rating.168  Unfortunately, 
Arkansas hospitals have further declined in the Fall 2020 
ranking.169  Arkansas’s health care system needs improvement, 
and there is no evidence that charitable immunity improves the 
quality of healthcare.  
On the other hand, liability is more likely to result in “care 
and caution.”170  It makes little sense that a nonprofit hospital “be 
charitable and give aid to others but . . . not compensate or aid 
those individuals who have been injured by it.”171  Rigorous state 
and federal accreditation and licensing standards prove those 
employed in hospitals and other healthcare organizations believe 
 
the liability insurance policy, and the plaintiff may proceed directly against the insurer 
regardless of the fact that the actual tortfeasor may not be sued under the laws of the state.”). 
165. See Miss. Baptist Hosp. v. Holmes, 55 So. 2d 142, 156 (1951) (“[I]t should be 
said that the tendency of immunity is to foster neglect . . . .”). 
166. The Leapfrog Grp., About the Grade, LEAPFROG HOSP. SAFETY GRADE, 
[https://perma.cc/NLG6-4NH5] (last updated Dec. 14, 2020) (“The Safety Grade is 
becoming the gold standard measure of patient safety, cited in MSNBC, The New York 
Times, and AARP The Magazine.  The Leapfrog Hospital Safety Grade uses up to 27 national 
performance measures from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the 
Leapfrog Hospital Survey and information from other supplemental data sources.  Taken 
together, those performance measures produce a single letter grade representing a hospital’s 
overall performance in keeping patients safe from preventable harm and medical errors.  The 
Leapfrog Hospital Safety Grade methodology has been peer reviewed and published in the 
Journal of Patient Safety.”). 
167. The Leapfrog Grp., State Rankings, LEAPFROG HOSP. SAFETY GRADE, 
[https://perma.cc/MS8Z-7939] (last updated Dec. 14, 2020) [hereinafter State Rankings]. 
168. Id.; see also The Leapfrog Grp., How Safe is Your Hospital?, LEAPFROG HOSP. 
SAFETY GRADE, [https://perma.cc/JH4M-7TDG] (last updated Dec. 14, 2020) (choose 
“Search By City/State”; then choose “AR”; then click “Search”) (reviewing detailed grades 
for respective Arkansas hospitals).  
169. State Rankings, supra note 167 (ranking Arkansas 46 out of 50 states with just 
6.90% of Arkansas hospitals obtaining an “A” rating).  
170. See Holmes, 55 So. 2d at 156 (“[T]he tendency of imposing liability is to induce 
care and caution in the treatment of those for whom these institutions were established.”). 
171. Albritton v. Neighborhood Ctrs. Ass’n for Child Dev., 466 N.E.2d 867, 870 (Ohio 
1984) (“Indeed, it is almost contradictory to hold that an institution organized to dispense 
charity shall be charitable and give aid to others but shall not compensate or aid those 
individuals who have been injured by it.”). 
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that it is “both desirable and feasible that a hospital assume certain 
responsibilities for the care of the patient.”172  
Hospitals do not run without employees, and medical 
professionals cannot operate without hospital facilities.  The two 
are not mutually exclusive and both should be bound by the 
functions of tort law.  Charitable immunity unjustly affects an 
individual’s right to relief from those who caused the injury and 
should no longer be a defense that hospitals can assert against 
individuals in the courtroom.  
VI.  ARKANSAS DOCTRINE  
Arkansas’s charitable immunity doctrine continues to 
operate “in a jurisprudential landscape of shifting sands.”173  
From the drastic changes in the case law to the lack of clarity in 
applying the eight-factor test, the courts have seen no stability or 
consistency despite what their “rule of property” hoped to 
ensure.174  The Arkansas Supreme Court must prospectively 
abrogate the doctrine of charitable immunity in light of the reality 
surrounding the modern hospital and establish clarity for 
practitioners.  
A. Arkansas’s (Significant) Issues 
The purpose for which charitable immunity was recognized 
in Arkansas was to prevent charitable institutions from “hav[ing] 
their assets diminished by” paying damages.175  As demonstrated 
above, the reality is that the modern charitable hospital has “trust 
 
172. Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 257 (Ill. 1965) (“The 
Standards for Hospital Accreditation, the state licensing regulations and the defendant’s 
bylaws demonstrate that the medical profession and other responsible authorities regard it as 
both desirable and feasible that a hospital assume certain responsibilities for the care of the 
patient.”). 
173. Felton v. Rebsamen Med. Ctr., Inc., 373 Ark. 472, 486, 284 S.W.3d 486, 496 
(2008) (Brown, J., dissenting). 
174. See Helton v. Sisters of Mercy of St. Joseph’s Hosp., 234 Ark. 76, 81, 351 S.W.2d 
129, 131 (1961).  
175. See Sowders v. St. Joseph’s Mercy Health Ctr., 368 Ark. 466, 470, 247 S.W.3d 
514, 517 (2007) (quoting George v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n, 337 Ark. 206, 211, 987 S.W.2d 
710, 712 (1999)). 
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attributes” with interests in many businesses and real estate, 
operating on daily “commercialized transactions.”176  
The Arkansas Hospital Association reports that it saved 
more than $47 million in costs and helped generate over $26 
million in revenue for Arkansas hospitals while, simultaneously, 
the provision of charity care decreased by 44%.177  Notably, the 
court recognizes that the “modern hospital . . . would find it 
extremely difficult to operate wholly or predominately on 
charitable donations.”178  Presumably, the court is aware of the 
vast availability of financial funds hospitals have at their disposal 
to pay a judgment.  Thus, tort liability would not deplete the 
hospital’s funds, which is the entire “essence of the [charitable 
immunity] doctrine.”179  Yet, the court continues to value the 
importance of charitable hospitals and their financial gain over 
the importance of essential principles of tort law—making a 
victim whole.180  
1. Judge v. Jury 
For charitable immunity to apply, the hospital must satisfy 
the Masterson eight-factor test adopted by the Arkansas Supreme 
Court, which asks:  
(1) whether the organization’s charter limits it to charitable 
or eleemosynary purposes; (2) whether the organization’s 
charter contains a “not-for-profit” limitation; (3) whether the 
organization’s goal is to break even; (4) whether the 
organization earned a profit; (5) whether any profit or 
surplus must be used for charitable or eleemosynary 
purposes; (6) whether the organization depends on 
contributions and donations for its existence; (7) whether the 
 
176. See supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text; Crossett Health Ctr. v. Croswell, 
221 Ark. 874, 883, 256 S.W.2d 548, 552 (1953). 
177. ARK HOSP. ASS’N, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT 9, 11 (2019), [https://perma.cc/HL3W-
WKQF]; ARK. HOSP. ASS’N, 2019 STATISTICS, supra note 80, at 47.  
178. Scamardo v. Sparks Reg’l Med. Ctr., 375 Ark. 300, 308, 289 S.W.3d 903, 908 
(2008) (quoting George, 337 Ark. at 214, 987 S.W.2d at 714).  
179. Sowders, 368 Ark. at 470, 247 S.W.3d at 517 (quoting George, 337 Ark. at 211, 
987 S.W.2d at 712). 
180. See Adkins v. St. Francis Hosp. of Charleston, W. Va., 143 S.E.2d 154, 162 (W. 
Va. 1965) (“One of the[] obligations [of a charitable corporation] is to make legally whole 
one who is injured by reason of the negligent act of its agents or employees.  It makes no 
difference whether the injured party is a paying patient or one who is being served without 
charge.”). 
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organization provides services free of charge to those unable 
to pay; and (8) whether the directors and officers receive 
compensation.181  
The court has since expounded on some of the factors;182 
however, the issue of who is to decide the application of the 
factors is often litigated.183  Undisputed facts are to be decided by 
the court while disputed facts are presented to the jury.184  When 
the facts are undisputed but subject to differing legal 
interpretations, the court determines the charitable standing of the 
hospital and grants summary judgment when reasonable minds 
would not differ based on those facts.185  However, allowing the 
judge to determine “issues of fact” from “‘legal interpretation[s] 
of undisputed facts,’ . . . runs counter to the foundational principle 
in our jurisprudence that juries are fact-finders—not the 
judges.”186 
Ironically, despite the claim that hospitals determined to be 
charitable are immune from suit, should the facts be disputed, the 
hospital is not actually immune from suit.  The issue of charitable 
status is presented to the jury, and thus, “a substantial portion of 
the defendant’s immunity from suit is lost by this process, 
regardless of the outcome.”187  The point of the parties coming 
before the court on the issue of charitable status is because they, 
in fact, do have reasonably differing views and interpretations of 
whether the hospital qualifies as charitable.  The ultimate question 
of whether the hospital is a charity is a factual inquiry.188  Despite 
the application of the factors and outcomes that have come before 
the court, reasonable minds could, and often do, differ.189 
Initially, the court interpreted the charitable immunity 
doctrine narrowly—often forgoing charitable immunity status by 
 
181. Masterson v. Stambuck, 321 Ark. 391, 400-01, 902 S.W.2d 803, 809-10 (1995) 
(explaining that the court adopted the eight-factor test from the Eastern District of Virginia). 
182. See Scamardo, 375 Ark. at 307-09, 289 S.W.3d at 907-09; see also Anglin v. 
Johnson Reg’l Med. Ctr., 375 Ark. 10, 16-18, 289 S.W.3d 28, 31-33 (2008).  
183. See Scamardo, 375 Ark. at 309, 289 S.W.3d at 909. 
184. See supra note 39 and accompanying text; Davis Nursing Ass’n v. Neal, 2019 
Ark. 91, at 6-8, 570 S.W.3d 457, 461-62. 
185. Davis, 2019 Ark. 91, at 6-7, 570 S.W.3d at 461 (quotations omitted) (citing 
Anglin, 375 Ark. at 21, 289 S.W.3d at 35).   
186. Anglin, 375 Ark. at 22, 289 S.W.3d at 36 (Brown, J., dissenting). 
187. Davis, 2019 Ark. 91, at 8, 570 S.W.3d at 462 (Wood, J., concurring). 
188. Anglin, 375 Ark. at 22, 289 S.W.3d at 36 (Brown, J., dissenting). 
189. See, e.g., id. at 22-23, 289 S.W.3d at 36. 
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evaluating a few of the factors later established in Masterson.190  
However, the court eventually broadened its application by 
evaluating more factors.191  
Factors (1) and (2) consider the organizational documents of 
the institution and, essentially, take their mere words at face 
value.192  Simply because the Articles of Incorporation limit the 
hospital to charitable purposes or its classification to tax-exempt 
has little bearing on how the hospital appears to function to 
outside observers.  As explained previously, charitable hospitals 
do the minimum to comply with IRS guidance.193  By strictly 
resorting to the words claimed on the page, the courts are being 
misled, and thus, causing considerable harm to application of the 
law.  
Next, the court provides little guidance on factors (3) and 
(4), which consider the financial history of the hospital.194  In one 
case, the court determined a hospital’s goal was not to break even 
simply because it operated at a loss of less than one percent.195  In 
another case, the court granted charitable immunity to a hospital 
that made “a net profit in most years” and had “over six million 
dollars in reserve funds.”196  Again, we see the court taking words 
at their face value when evaluating factor (5) in that the hospital 
stated they used their surplus funds for charitable purposes but 
failed to elaborate or provide evidence of how that was 
accomplished.197  Although charitable institutions can be 
profitable and such profits are not inured for private benefit, the 
 
190. See Williams v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n, 246 Ark. 1231, 1235, 442 S.W.2d 243, 
244 (1969) (quoting Hot Springs Sch. Dist. v. Sisters of Mercy, 84 Ark. 497, 500, 106 S.W. 
954, 955 (1907)); Masterson v. Stambuck, 321 Ark. 391, 401, 902 S.W.2d 803, 809-10 
(1995). 
191. Williams, 246 Ark. at 1235, 442 S.W.2d at 244-45 (citing Helton v. Sisters of 
Mercy of St. Joseph’s Hosp., 234 Ark. 76, 351 S.W.2d 129 (1961)). 
192. See Masterson, 321 Ark. at 401, 902 S.W.3d at 809; see, e.g., George v. Jefferson 
Hosp. Ass’n, 337 Ark. 206, 212, 987 S.W.2d 710, 713 (1999) (stating that “[t]he first and 
second [factors] are perhaps the easiest of the factors to demonstrate as they are merely a 
matter of possessing corporate documentation”). 
193. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
194. See Masterson, 321 Ark. at 401, 902 S.W.3d at 809.  
195. Scamardo v. Sparks Reg’l Med. Ctr., 375 Ark. 300, 307-08, 289 S.W.3d 903, 908 
(2008). 
196. Anglin v. Johnson Reg’l Med. Ctr., 375 Ark. 10, 22, 289 S.W.3d 28, 36 (2008) 
(Brown, J., dissenting). 
197. Jackson v. Sparks Reg’l Med. Ctr., 375 Ark. 533, 540, 294 S.W.3d 1, 5 (2009) 
(explaining that the affidavit stated that any surplus funds are used for charitable purposes). 
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retained profits are used for its charitable purpose, which, as a 
hospital, is to provide care for the injured.  This should be the case 
no matter how the patient is injured.  
Notably, factor (6) should be eliminated—whether the 
organization depends on contributions and donations for 
existence has largely become irrelevant.  While this factor would 
make a difference should hospitals actually be funded largely by 
private contributions, the modern hospital is not, and this factor 
rarely impacts whether charitable immunity is or is not granted.198  
The court has recognized that charitable hospitals largely do not 
run on contributions and donations because they have access to 
government financing and can seek payment from private 
insurers.199  This alone negates the entire purpose for which 
charitable immunity was first recognized—that the assets held in 
trust only be used for their charitable purpose.200  Nonetheless, 
the court has stated that receiving funds from other sources does 
not “negate its overriding charitable purpose.”201 
While factor (7) is still somewhat applicable in that 
charitable hospitals do provide some services free of charge to 
those unable to pay, it is an insignificant portion of whom that 
they provide services to.202  It is not likely that charitable hospitals 
would cease treating indigent patients should immunity be 
eliminated.  To satisfy IRS guidance, these requirements still 
must be maintained, and there is no evidence that hospitals in 
states that have long ago abrogated the doctrine fail to treat 
patients despite their inability to pay.203  
Finally, factor (8), the amount in which directors and officers 
are compensated, shows no indication of weighing against the 
hospital.204  The court recognizes that the modern hospital is 
large, complex, and needs well-qualified personnel; therefore, 
being well compensated is the only reasonable way to obtain 
 
198. See id. at 541, 294 S.W.3d at 5.  
199. See Scamardo, 375 Ark. at 308, 289 S.W.3d at 908. 
200. George v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n, 337 Ark. 206, 211, 987 S.W.2d 710, 712 (1999). 
201. Id. at 214, 987 S.W.2d at 714. 
202. See discussion supra Part IV.A.4. 
203. See discussion supra Part IV.A.4.  
204. See Anglin v. Johnson Reg’l Med. Ctr., 375 Ark. 10, 23, 289 S.W.3d 28, 37 (2008) 
(Brown, J., dissenting). 
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someone who can handle hospital business.205  It is unlikely 
hospitals will become smaller or less complex and need less-
qualified personnel.  Thus, high compensation will likely always 
be justified.  
Consequently, there is no clear or sound application of these 
factors.  It seems that, by adopting these factors so long ago, the 
court avoided the inevitable—abolishing the doctrine.206  
2. Prolonging the Outcome 
When hospitals are denied charitable immunity at the trial 
court level, appellate courts will review the decision on 
interlocutory appeal, even though denied motions for summary 
judgment are “neither reviewable nor appealable.”207  The stated 
reasoning behind doing so is that immunity from suit would 
otherwise be lost.208  However, the hospital going through the 
appeals process is evidence of the fact that immunity from suit is 
already lost.  Justice Baker correctly notes that a failure to 
recognize charitable immunity status by a denied summary 
judgment order does not, in fact, discontinue the action and result 
in a final, appealable order.209  The medical malpractice claim 
actually continues and, like all other individuals and businesses, 
the hospital will have the opportunity to take advantage of the 
appeals process at the conclusion of litigation.210  
By permitting this to occur, the court is causing unnecessary 
administrative burden on itself and the parties involved—as well 
as prolonging a determination of the underlying issues of the tort 
claim.  “[T]he purpose of a final order,” of which this is not, “is 
to avoid piecemeal litigation.”211  Claims of this nature add years 
 
205. George v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n, 337 Ark. 206, 214, 987 S.W.2d 710, 714 (1999) 
(explaining that the “size and complexity [of hospitals] make knowledgeable, well-qualified 
personnel essential”). 
206. See Masterson v. Stambuck, 321 Ark. 391, 400, 902 S.W.2d 803, 809 (1995). 
207. R. F. Chase, Annotation, Reviewability of Order Denying Motion for Summary 
Judgment, 15 A.L.R. 3d 899 (1967). 
208. Id. 
209. Davis Nursing Ass’n v. Neal, 2019 Ark. 91, at 9, 570 S.W.3d 457, 462 (Baker, J., 
dissenting). 
210. Id., 570 S.W.3d at 462 (Baker, J., dissenting). 
211. Id. at 10, 570 S.W.3d at 463 (Baker, J., dissenting). 
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onto the litigation process and are an injustice to practitioners and 
individuals.212 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
There is no justification for continued adherence to 
charitable immunity.  Arkansas is one of the last states to 
recognize this antiquated doctrine, which only serves as an 
injustice in the legal system.213  The Arkansas Supreme Court has 
one choice:  continue to give favorable treatment in the courtroom 
to the commercial business of charitable hospitals or allow justice 
to precede generosity.  
 




212. See id. at 9, 570 S.W.3d at 462 (Baker, J., dissenting); Masterson v. Stambuck, 
321 Ark. 391, 394, 902 S.W.2d 803, 806 (1995). 
213. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
